Dismantling an Embedded Autocracy (ECPS, April 15, 2026)

The European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) has asked me to write an analysis on the 2026 Hungarian elections. The article was published on April 15, 2026.

In this timely and analytically rich commentary, Associate Professor Attila Antal examines the aftermath of Viktor Orbán’s electoral defeat and the formidable challenge of dismantling an entrenched authoritarian system. Moving beyond the electoral outcome, Assoc. Prof. Antal argues that the core question is whether Hungary is witnessing a mere сhange of government or a deeper regime transformation. He identifies three interrelated arenas—propaganda and moral panic, institutionalized autocracy, and transnational authoritarian networks—as central to this process. The analysis underscores that while electoral victory is decisive, it is insufficient on its own: the durability of Orbánism lies in its embedded structures. The piece ultimately frames Hungary as a critical test case for democratic resilience and the possibility of reversing authoritarian consolidation within the European Union.

By Attila Antal

The Orbán government, which had been in power since 2010, was defeated in the 2026 Hungarian parliamentary elections. The Tisza Party, which formed a united opposition, will in all likelihood hold a two-thirds, i.e., constitutional, majority in the National Assembly. The most important question for the coming period is whether this strong mandate will be sufficient to dismantle an institutionalized authoritarian regime.

The election resulted in a landslide victory for the opposition, and although final/official results are not yet available and recounts are still underway (98.94% of votes have been tallied), the current results show that Hungarian society has risen up against the Orbán government: the ruling parties’ list received 2,375,468 votes (39.53% of the votes cast), the Tisza Party received 3,128,859 votes, representing 52.1% of the total, and the far-right Mi Hazánk party will also enter parliament with 343,684 votes (5.74% of the total).

All this means that currently (as of April 15, 2026), with 137 members (having won 93 individual districts and 44 seats on the party list), the Tisza Party is the largest faction in the 199-member Hungarian parliament, while the former ruling party, Fidesz-KDNP, received a dramatically small 56 seats (the collapse of the ruling parties occurred at the level of individual constituencies, where they managed to win 14 seats, accompanied by 43 list seats), and the far-right Mi Hazánk party received 6 seats from the party list.

The collapse of the Orbán government was thus caused, on the one hand, by the radical loss of individual constituencies (traditional rural constituencies belonging to Fidesz were lost to the Tisza Party, where non-Orbánist candidates had previously almost never won), and this was compounded by the record-high voter turnout, which can be interpreted within the context of the mood for systemic change: 5,988,778 people cast their votes, representing 79.56% of eligible voters.

In my view, the fact that the authoritarian Orbán government could be removed through an election does not negate the regime’s authoritarian nature, and only time will tell whether what has occurred is merely a change of government or a change of regime. However, despite its very significant mandate, the Tisza Party will have a very difficult task dismantling the remnants of the authoritarian Orbán regime. In what follows, I will examine this from three perspectives: Orbán’s politics of hatred, the institutionalization of autocracy, and the international network of autocracies.

Dealing with the Hatred and Moral Panic Generated by the Orbán Regime

One of the most important challenges in dismantling the authoritarian regime is dismantling the Orbán propaganda machine, which has been a fundamental pillar of Orbán’s power politics since 2010. This culminated in the 2026 campaign, in which the Orbán regime effectively functioned as a tool of Putin’s propaganda.

Starting in 2015, the fabrication of enemy stereotypes was continuous: refugees and immigrants, NGOs and civil society, the EU and Brussels, domestic political opponents, George Soros and his institutions. From 2022 onward, however, the Orbán regime was increasingly defined by overt Putinist hate-mongering and daily moral panic.

All of this led to President Zelenskyy becoming the greatest enemy in the 2026 campaign, with Hungarian propagandists portraying the Tisza Party as if it represented no Hungarian interests whatsoever and served Ukrainian and Brussels interests. The main message was that if the opposition came to power, Hungary would be dragged into the war—in other words, only Orbán could prevent the worst from happening.

All of this had a devastating effect on Hungarian public discourse, and the lies and hatred propagated became unbearable for Hungarian society. Orbán sought to make people believe that he wanted to avoid war, but in reality, from a communicative and ideological standpoint, he had long since entered it—on Putin’s side.

All of this was further underscored by the fact that, in the final stretch of the campaign, unprecedented leaks began to emerge from Western intelligence agencies via the independent Hungarian press. These confirmed that the Orbán regime had committed itself, at the highest levels (including the foreign minister), to representing Russian interests and had attempted to use the Hungarian police and intelligence services to undermine the Tisza Party.

These leaks played a key role in preventing the Orbán regime—which presumably cooperates continuously with the Russians—from successfully carrying out any gray-zone operations, while also reinforcing the Hungarian opposition’s belief that the Orbán regime had committed treason.

It has thus become clear that the Orbán regime is capable of stoking hatred to the extreme, and addressing this both socially and institutionally must be a key task for the next government. Maintaining the remnants of Orbán’s autocracy and failing to hold those responsible to account will create a situation that could pave the way for the next authoritarian backlash.

Dismantling the Institutional and Political Foundations of the Authoritarian Regime

There is no doubt that the next government’s second-biggest challenge will be dismantling the institutionalized autocracy—a task that will not be easy for the new government, even with a supermajority to amend the constitution. For this reason, Péter Magyar called on the most important public officials of the Orbán regime to resign on election night, even though they have so far indicated that they will not step down.

A key issue for the new democracy and constitutional order to be built is the neutralization of the remnants of the Orbán regime embedded in the public and political system. A related question is how the new government will act to ensure accountability and whether it will find a way to reclaim the assets that the oligarchs of the Orbán regime have stashed away in private capital funds.

All of this has significance beyond itself, since it is precisely the nature of law in authoritarian systems to declare solutions and matters that are unacceptable from a democratic perspective to be legal; however, this seriously jeopardizes both the functioning of democracy and the constitutional norms intended to be institutionalized.

The Collapse of Orbán’s Regime in the Context of the International Authoritarian Right

Not only did the Orbán regime collapse unexpectedly in a political sense, but so too did the international authoritarian right-wing structure that Orbán had sought to build. It proved to be a significant sign that, on April 5, 2026, explosives were found on the Serbian section of the Turkish Stream gas pipeline, and although Orbán’s propaganda tried to use this against the Ukrainians in line with the campaign, President Vučić surprisingly did not prove to be a partner in supporting Orbán.

Just before the election, on April 7, US Vice President J.D. Vance visited Hungary—a visit in which the government had placed enormous hopes. Vance had already stated at that time that the US would cooperate with a new government, and after the election, he remarked that Orbán’s defeat “did not surprise” him.

The most surprising development, however, was that the Kremlin quickly let go of Orbán’s hand (at least on the surface). Orbán, who had represented Russian interests to the very end, was met with a remark from Putin’s spokesperson, Dmitry Peskov, who stated, “we were never friends,” adding that they were satisfied that Hungary remained open to pragmatic cooperation.

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The Hungarian opposition’s victory over the Orbán regime could therefore serve as an important lesson in several respects for the European Union and, more broadly, for authoritarian political regimes. On the one hand, it is a significant lesson that illiberal authoritarian regimes operating under one-party hegemony can be defeated through elections; however, the international political environment and the cooperation that supports the opposition through political and other means can play an important and indispensable role in this (as was the case with the Western and Central and Eastern European forces supporting the Tisza Party).

Through the Orbán regime’s constant vetoing, its incitement of hatred against Ukraine, and its representation of Putinist interests within the EU, it has essentially provoked a form of international and Hungarian cooperation that can rightly be described as the first manifestation of a cross-border “militant democracy” within the EU.

The coming period will determine whether the success of the April 2026 election will bring about merely a change of government or something more: the removal of an embedded authoritarian regime. For this to happen, the new Hungarian government and the EU must work together to dismantle the remnants of the Orbán regime; this could deal a decisive blow to the international authoritarian right.

OHPA Workshop - Illiberal Populism & Anti-Environmental Backlash in Europe (CEU, April 10, 2026)

On April 10, 2026, I will be participating in the OHPA Workshop – Illiberal Populism & Anti-Environmental Backlash in Europe at CEU.

Orbán’s Election Project Seeks Public Backing for Dictatorial Turn, Not Democratic Legitimacy (ECPS, April 7, 2026)

The European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) interviewed me about the Orbán regime ahead of the 2026 election.

As Hungary approaches the April 12 elections, Viktor Orbán’s long-standing rule faces a critical test shaped by both domestic discontent and geopolitical realignments. In this interview, Associate Professor Attila Antal characterizes the regime as a “constitutional dictatorship,” arguing that the election is not about democratic legitimacy but about securing “public support for its own dictatorial turn.” He highlights how authoritarian legality, sustained through a “dual state” and permanent emergency governance, has hollowed out democratic competition. At the same time, the rise of Péter Magyar and mounting generational and material grievances signal growing resistance. Situated within broader transnational authoritarian networks, Hungary’s election emerges as both a domestic referendum and a geopolitical fault line for European democracy.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

As Hungary approaches its pivotal parliamentary elections on April 12, 2026, the country stands at a defining juncture in the trajectory of European populism. After more than a decade and a half of rule by Viktor Orbán, the electoral contest no longer centers merely on party competition, but on whether an entrenched authoritarian-populist regime—characterized by institutional asymmetries, constitutional engineering, and the continuous production of political enemies—can still be meaningfully challenged through democratic means. At the same time, the emergence of Péter Magyar and the Tisza Party has introduced new uncertainty into a system long sustained by what Attila Antal describes as a “hegemonic power bloc,” raising the stakes of what increasingly resembles a systemic referendum.

In this context, Attila Antal, Associate Professor at Eötvös Loránd University, offers a sobering interpretation of the current moment. In his view, the Orbán regime has evolved beyond conventional electoral authoritarianism into what he terms a “constitutional dictatorship,” where formal legality coexists with substantive domination. Most strikingly, Assoc. Prof. Antal argues that “the Orbán regime is not seeking democratic legitimacy in the 2026 elections, but rather public support for its own dictatorial turn.” This diagnosis reframes the election not as a mechanism of accountability, but as a plebiscitary instrument designed to consolidate power under conditions of managed legality.

Crucially, Assoc. Prof. Antal situates Hungary’s electoral moment within a broader geopolitical reconfiguration. He underscores that Orbán has increasingly treated foreign and European policy “as a kind of geopolitical playing field,” cultivating alliances with both Eastern and Western authoritarian actors. The alignment with figures such as Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin reflects not only ideological affinity but also strategic positioning within an emerging transnational authoritarian network. As Assoc. Prof. Antal notes, Hungary has come to function as a “Trojan horse” for Putinist influence within the European Union, transforming the election into “a European and Western geopolitical issue and interest.” This external dimension is mirrored internally by a deepening social cleavage, as segments of Hungarian society remain firmly oriented toward the West while the regime consolidates a pro-Russian political base.

This external dimension intersects with internal tensions, including growing social discontent and a generational divide that reflects what Assoc. Prof. Antal describes as “a very strong generational revolt against Orbán’s authoritarian populism.”

At the core of Assoc. Prof. Antal’s analysis is the concept of authoritarian law and the “dual state,” where a formally normative legal order coexists with a politically driven prerogative structure. Under prolonged states of emergency and rule by decree, Hungary has become, in his words, “a contemporary example of dual state,” raising profound questions about whether elections can still function as instruments of democratic alternation. The opposition’s strategy of contesting the regime “by its own rules” thus reflects a deeper dilemma: whether authoritarian systems can be dismantled through participation in the very institutional frameworks they have reshaped.

Assoc. Prof. Antal’s assessment is stark. The durability of Orbánism, he suggests, lies in its capacity to adapt, radicalize, and survive through escalating authoritarianism. As he warns, the regime “can only survive by becoming increasingly dictatorial,” a trajectory that poses not only a domestic challenge but “a grave danger to both Hungarian and European societies as a whole.”

Here is the edited version of our interview with Associate Professor Attila Antal, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.

Geopolitics and Domestic Change Reshape Orbánism

Professor Antal, in your work you describe Hungarian authoritarian populism as a system that fuses political identity construction, executive aggrandizement, and the legal-institutional reorganization of power. In the 2026 campaign, do you see Orbánism still functioning as a hegemonic political project, or has it entered a phase of ideological exhaustion in which its capacity to define “the people” and monopolize popular sovereignty is beginning to weaken?

Associate Professor Attila Antal: This is a key issue for understanding the Orbán regime as a whole and the current situation. Indeed, Orbán has built an authoritarian regime in which the ruling parties have reigned as a kind of hegemonic center—or, to use Antonio Gramsci’s terminology, as a hegemonic power bloc. However, the transformation of the opposition has changed the situation and shaken this hegemonic project. This is, however, a complex situation: in recent years, Orbán had become so confident that he increasingly focused on geopolitics; more precisely, he treated foreign policy and European policy as a kind of geopolitical playing field, where he built power and political alliances with both Eastern and Western authoritarian regimes. It is no coincidence that the two most significant imperialist powers, Trump and Putin, have both assured Orbán of their support. So, I see the collapse of Orbán’s hegemonic project as only partially attributable to domestic political factors: we are witnessing that Orbán’s downfall has become a European and Western geopolitical issue and interest, and this resonates with the anger of Hungarian society, which, for the most part, remains oriented toward the West.

Enemy Narratives Persist but Face Social Limits

You have argued that authoritarian populism in Hungary relies on permanent enemy-production. In the current election, where Kyiv, Brussels, liberal elites, and domestic opponents are again being woven into a single antagonistic narrative, how should we understand this strategy: as a sign of discursive resilience, or as evidence that the regime has become trapped in repetitive forms of mobilization?

Associate Professor Attila Antal: The enemy creation of the Orbán regime is a highly complex story. There is no doubt that the constant creation of enemy images is one of the most prominent components of the authoritarian populist toolkit. Since 2010, the Orbán regime has operated with the following main enemy images: migrants, George Soros, civil society, Brussels, the gender politics, and the domestic political opposition. 

From this perspective, 2022 marks a turning point, as Putin’s aggression required the construction of a new enemy image – an incredibly difficult task, given that the attacked Ukraine must be transformed into the new enemy. All of this is connected to the “Putinization” that has taken place within the Orbán regime. The propaganda and discursive framework are thus in place, yet creating this new enemy image also means that Orbán and his allies face the reality that a significant portion of Hungarian society is quite averse to Russians due to Hungarian history. At the same time, Orbán and his allies have succeeded in turning their own camp into a pro-Russian faction, which has resulted in an incredibly deep social cleavage.

Anti-Orbánism Unites a Fragmented Opposition

To what extent should the April 12 vote be interpreted not simply as a contest between Fidesz and Tisza, but as a referendum on whether a mature authoritarian-populist regime can still be electorally displaced despite media asymmetries, constitutional engineering, and patronage entrenchment?

Associate Professor Attila Antal: As I mentioned earlier, the Orbán regime itself and the new opposition forming against it can be understood within a geopolitical context. One could also say that, in many respects, the European Union has had enough of the Putinist influence that the Orbán regime represents as a “Trojan horse.” At the same time, this dissatisfaction is just as true of Hungarian society: at the moment, the opposition is held together by anti-Orbánism and the fact that the Orbán regime has seriously neglected governance and the basic needs of the Hungarian people. In this sense, the Hungarian election can indeed be interpreted as a referendum on the political system.

Dual State Logic Structures Political Competition

Your recent work on authoritarian law suggests that contemporary autocratic projects do not abolish legality so much as repurpose it. In the Hungarian case, how should we conceptualize the election itself: as a democratic mechanism still capable of producing alternation, or as a legally managed arena whose formal openness coexists with substantive authoritarian constraint?

Associate Professor Attila Antal: I think this is a very important question. When I analyzed the legal system of the Orbán regime, I drew on the “dual state” approach developed by Ernst Fraenkel, who studied the nature of National Socialist law in the interwar period. In this authoritarian state, there exists a legal system that is totally influenced by politics (which Fraenkel calls the Prerogative State), while at the same time there is the Normative State, which is less defined by political influence. 

The Orbán regime has effectively been operating under a state of emergency since 2015, and since 2022, the prime minister has essentially been governing by decree. So, we are facing a contemporary example of dual state.

In my view, there is a very strong dilemma: can this system be overthrown by accepting its rules of the game and participating in the election, or can we overthrow the system as a result of a collective popular decision and establish new democratic electoral rules? It now appears that the opposition side of Hungarian society is choosing the former solution, that is, it wants to defeat the authoritarian system by its own rules. At the same time, it is certain that in the event of a possible change of government, we will have to face the problem posed by authoritarian law.

Enemy Logic Embedded in Governance Structures

You have written about the “Constitutionalized Image of Enemy” embedded in the Hungarian Fundamental Law. How central is this constitutionalized enemy logic to the present campaign, especially in Orbán’s efforts to portray Tisza, Brussels, and Ukraine not as legitimate competitors, but as existential threats to the political community?

Associate Professor Attila Antal: The most recent amendment to the Fundamental Law took place in April 2025. The Hungarian Fundamental Law has indeed been used to create the prevailing political enemy images: certainly, with regard to migration and gender politics. I have termed this as the “Constitutionalized Image of the Enemy.” In this sense, therefore, the image of the enemy enshrined in the constitution did not play a role in the current campaign. At the same time, the 12th Amendment to the Fundamental Law established the Office for the Protection of National Sovereignty in December 2023, which played a very significant role in enabling the Orbán regime to essentially begin using state and bureaucratic tools against its political opponents and Hungarian society. In other words, the “dual state” mentioned earlier operates at the constitutional level as well.

Geopolitical Counterweight Shapes Opposition Rise

From the standpoint of your theory of authoritarian populism, is Péter Magyar best understood as a democratic challenger to Orbánism, or as a post-Fidesz corrective emerging from within the same political and ideological ecosystem?

Associate Professor Attila Antal: This is a very difficult question, and it would be too early to give any definitive answer at this stage. I would rather point out that the Hungarian election has a very strong geopolitical context. The Péter Magyar phenomenon and the European support structure behind it can also be understood as a geopolitical counterweight to Hungary’s shift toward Orbán and Putin. At the same time, there is no doubt that Orbán’s challenger was socialized within the Orbán regime and, in many respects, is attempting to correct the right-wing conservative politics that Orbán has betrayed. Here, however, it is worth noting once again that the vast camp behind the Tisza Party is far more complex and is currently held together by the constraints of the electoral system and anti-Orbánism.

Youth Revolt Meets Rural Entrenchment

Independent polling and current reporting suggest that younger voters are disproportionately aligning with Tisza, while Fidesz retains stronger support among older and more rural constituencies. Do you interpret this as a generational realignment against authoritarian populism, or merely as a contingent reaction to economic stagnation and elite scandal?

Associate Professor Attila Antal: This is also a key issue. There is no doubt that the authoritarian populism of the Orbán regime has, intentionally or not, created a generational and regional divide. A significant portion of rural and elderly Hungarian voters is far more susceptible to the enemy stereotypes and messages manufactured by the regime’s propaganda. Thus, there is a very strong generational revolt against Orbán’s authoritarian populism, particularly because Orbán is effectively blackmailing not only the EU but also Hungarian society: the former with constant vetoes, and the latter with constant threats of leaving the EU.

Middle-Class Erosion Fuels Political Backlash

Given your emphasis on the relationship between neoliberal restructuring and authoritarian populism, how important are material grievances—stagnant growth, inflation, deteriorating public services, and corruption fatigue—in weakening the regime’s capacity to maintain consent? Can economic deterioration disrupt a system whose legitimacy has long depended on symbolic conflict rather than policy performance?

Associate Professor Attila Antal: From a political-economic perspective, the Orbán regime was based on a class consensus in which the (upper) middle class and national big business formed an alliance. This was underpinned by pre-COVID-19 economic prosperity and massive amounts of EU funding. During this period of economic prosperity, however, a neoliberal state emerged that systematically dismantled public services, particularly in the healthcare and education sectors. When the polycrisis emerged (EU crises, pandemic, war), the dismantled Orbán state proved unable to handle the crisis: alongside the groups in the worst situations, the declining Hungarian middle class is the biggest loser of the Orbán regime. In other words, the rebellion against the Orbán regime is, in many respects, also of a material nature.

War Narrative Enables Democratic Suspension

How do you interpret Orbán’s continued “peace versus war” framing in light of your broader work on the politics of exception? Is this campaign discourse best seen as a contemporary form of emergency politics—one that converts geopolitical uncertainty into a justification for executive concentration and democratic suspension?

Associate Professor Attila Antal: As I mentioned, since 2022 the prime minister has essentially been governing by decree, encroaching even on areas of public policy where a state of emergency has no place. Meanwhile, political propaganda has constantly claimed that the Orbán regime is the only guarantee of peace. This has come to a head in the current campaign, with the Orbán machine conveying the message that the opposition is on the side of the Ukrainians and is dragging Hungary into the war. Governing through extraordinary measures is thus a political and communicative reframing: the Orbán regime has essentially suspended parliamentary democracy and portrayed the Ukrainian side (including the EU and the Hungarian opposition) as wanting war. I believe that this is not just some kind of fake news campaign, but the pure and frightening manifestation of an authoritarian state.

Sovereigntist Rhetoric Masks Strategic Dependence

Hungary’s pro-Russian posture has become a major campaign fault line. In your view, does Orbán’s Moscow-friendly stance still function as a coherent ideological expression of sovereigntist anti-liberalism, or is it increasingly becoming a liability as the war in Ukraine reshapes the moral and geopolitical boundaries of European politics?

Associate Professor Attila Antal: Orbán’s pro-Russian policy is a complex phenomenon. At least three aspects are worth highlighting. On the one hand, there is no doubt that, with regard to the international authoritarian right, there exists a kind of ideological coalition whose political-theoretical foundation is an anti-liberal conservative approach dating back to Carl Schmitt. Second, the Orbán regime has radically relinquished energy sovereignty in favor of Putinism. Third, there is also no doubt that Orbán and his regime are personally dependent on Putin’s system. Here, then, lies a radical contradiction: the Orbán regime, which is sovereignist at the level of propaganda, has deliberately renounced the sovereignty of the Hungarian state and is weakening European sovereignty in favor of Russia. The deeper implications of this can only be revealed after the election.

Militant Democracy as a Possible Path

You have shown how exceptional governance can become normalized. If Tisza were to win without a constitutional supermajority, would Hungary enter a phase of partial alternation without regime transformation—in other words, a situation in which a new government governs through institutions still structured by the old exception-centered order?

Associate Professor Attila Antal: I believe this is one of the main consequences of the dilemma I mentioned earlier: namely, how to dismantle an authoritarian system – either by adhering to its own rules or through more revolutionary means. If there is a change of government and a two-thirds majority is achieved, dismantling the authoritarian power of the Orbán regime will be a challenge. If, however, the change of government occurs with a simple majority, it may become inevitable to consider how the authoritarian system can be dismantled using the tools of militant democracy.

EU Influence and Domestic Revolt Intersect

What would a Tisza victory actually reveal about the Orbán system: that authoritarian-populist rule remains vulnerable to democratic challenge, or that only an insider-led revolt from within the regime’s broader political class can break such a system electorally?

Associate Professor Attila Antal: Based on what we’ve seen so far, I believe a potential victory for Tisza would have two implications. On the one hand, it would signal that the EU has had enough of Putinism directly influencing European politics. On the other hand, it would mean that authoritarian populism has become completely detached from social reality, and that Hungarian society has had enough of a political agenda built on constant hatemongering and the suspension of normality.

Authoritarian Consolidation Beyond Legitimacy

Conversely, if Fidesz were to retain power despite signs of economic strain, ideological repetition, corruption exposure, and opposition momentum, what would that tell us about the resilience of contemporary populist rule in Europe? Would it suggest that once authoritarian populism successfully constitutionalizes its power, elections alone become insufficient to dislodge it?

Associate Professor Attila Antal: I believe this is the most important issue of our time. Unfortunately, my grim assessment is that the Orbán regime is not seeking democratic legitimacy in the 2026 elections, but rather public support for its own dictatorial turn. I have long regarded the Orbán regime as a constitutional dictatorship, which means, on the one hand, that contemporary autocracies have a constitutional framework, and on the other hand, that certain segments of society have renounced democracy and accept the exercise of authoritarian power. Overall, therefore, the Orbán regime can only survive by becoming increasingly dictatorial, a trend that poses a grave danger to both Hungarian and European society as a whole.

Competing Visions of European Sovereignty

From the perspective of European integration, do you see this election as a struggle between two models of sovereignty: Orbán’s confrontational, anti-imperial, anti-Brussels sovereigntism and a more cooperative, rule-of-law-based claim to national interest that Tisza is trying to articulate? Or is that dichotomy too neat for the political realities of contemporary Hungary?

Associate Professor Attila Antal: First of all, the Orbán regime is indeed imperialist, and it pursues policies that serve Russian imperialist interests. The Hungarian election is crucial from the perspective of European integration, as the dilemma is whether there exists a European sovereignty that can be relied upon to stand up against authoritarian tendencies such as Trumpism and Putinism. I am committed to the idea, as Karl Loewenstein put it, that democracy must develop its own self-defense mechanisms and fight back – in our case, at both the member state and EU levels.

External Validation Meets Internal Resistance

Hungary has become a reference point within transnational right-wing networks, and Orbán continues to attract symbolic support from US and European conservative actors. In analytical terms, how much does this external validation matter domestically? Does it strengthen the regime’s legitimacy, or does it mainly reinforce Orbán’s self-image as a global ideological entrepreneur?

Associate Professor Attila Antal: From the perspective of ideological and political networking, the Orbán regime truly acts as a mediator between Western and Eastern authoritarian tendencies. This is why organizing the European far right is of key importance to Orbán. All of this undoubtedly has an impact on his own camp. At the same time, Orbán’s status as a “global ideological entrepreneur” represents the very project against which the Hungarian opposition has been able to unite and become committed to a change of government.

De-capture vs. Persistence of Orbánism

Finally, through the lens of your work on authoritarian law and exceptional governance, what would be the most theoretically significant post-election question for scholars to watch: whether electoral alternation occurs, whether institutional de-capture proves possible, or whether the deeper legacy of Orbánism survives regardless of who forms the next government?

Associate Professor Attila Antal: This is also one of the most important dilemmas of our era from both a Hungarian and a European perspective, as the political and legal consequences of the Orbán regime are toxic to European integration as a whole. On the one hand, just as happened after World War II, we must once again grapple with the question of how to take democratic action against authoritarian legal and political systems. On the other hand, and even more importantly: we must finally prevent the distortion of liberal democracies toward authoritarianism not only through constitutional institutions but also through effective economic and cultural means. In my view, it is crucial to examine how global capitalism and neoliberalism have distorted liberal constitutionalism and how they have eroded the social foundations of democracies through austerity measures and the dismantling of welfare systems.

A diktatúra választása (Magyar Hang, 2026. március 26.)

Megjelent: Magyar Hang, 2026. március 27.

Az Orbán-rendszer leváltásához a Tisza Pártnál szélesebb népi mozgalomra van szükség, ugyanis az autoriter politikai rendszerek a legritkább esetben válthatók le pusztán választás segítségével. Orbánék eltökéltek abban, hogy bármilyen eszközt bevetnek azért, hogy hatalomban maradjanak, és eljutottunk oda, hogy a rendszer immáron nem demokratikus felhatalmazást keres a választásban, hanem a nyílt autoriter hatalom igazolását. Orbán Viktor tehát a diktatúrát választotta, nekünk pedig meg kell harcolni a demokráciáért!

Az orbáni hatalom olyan bel- és külpolitikai helyzetbe lavírozta magát, hogy a rendszer korrupciója, romlottsága, a vele szembeni felhalmozott elégedetlenség, valamint Magyarországnak a nyugati integrációból való kiszakítása és a putyinista érdekkörbe szorítása következtében egészen egyszerűen úgy érzik, hogy bármit megtehetnek (és meg is kell tegyenek) a hatalom megőrzése érdekében, hiszen akkora a vesztenivalójuk. Egy autoriter rendszerben (amelyben a félelem erői működnek, és nemcsak a társadalom, hanem a rendszer működtetői is rettegnek) aligha képzelhető el, hogy az autoriter vezető békésen átadja a hatalmat. Ez a sarokba szorítottság hihetetlenül veszélyes a magyar társadalomra, hiszen az orbáni propaganda által felépített hazugsággyár olyan párhuzamos valóságokat hozott lére, olyan mély gyűlöletet ültetett el a szembenálló csoportokban, hogy abból egy egyszerű kormányváltással aligha lesz kiút.

Ebben az írásban egyrészt amellett érvelek, hogy az Orbán-rendszer leváltásához a választással kikényszerített kormányváltás szükséges, de nem elégséges feltétel lehet. Másrészt egy olyan átfogó népi mozgalomra lenne szükség, amely szembenéz azzal, hogy mit tett az Orbán-rendszer a magyar állammal és társadalommal, valamint azzal, hogy ha a hatalom saját diktatórikus fordulatát akarja legitimálni a választással, akkor bizony harcolni kell a demokráciáért.

Az autoriter rezsimek nem válthatók le önmagában választással

Régóta meg vagyok arról győződve, hogy egy kiteljesedett autoriter politikai rendszer nem váltható le csak és kizárólag választás útján. Itt most nemcsak arról van szó, hogy az Orbán-rendszer által létrehozott választási rendszer, politika-finanszírozási megoldások, az állami és közösségi médiás kommunikációban látható erőfölény tisztán a rezsim érdekeit szolgálják, hanem sokkal inkább arról, hogy Orbánék létrehoztak egy olyan állampárti működésmódot, amellyel olyan módon torzították el a magyar állam közhatalmi és közigazgatási működését, amelyet immáron aligha lehet egyszerű kormányváltással helyreállítani. Az autoriter rendszerek leváltásában igenis lehet szerepe a választásnak (lásd a közép-kelet-európai rendszerváltások vagy Milošević esetét), de ezek mindig egy tágabb kontextusba, rendszerválságba és a rendszerrel szembeni lehető legszélesebb körű népi mozgalomba illeszkednek. Ezek miatt sohasem értettem azt, hogy Magyar Péter miért gondolja úgy, hogy pusztán elegendő a választásra apellálni, illetve, hogy ki lehet rekeszteni a korábbi ellenzéki erőket a rendszer leváltásának folyamatából (eközben pedig a korábbi szavazóikat erővel be lehet tagolni a Tisza Párt mögötti széles választási koalícióba). Mindezek ellenére úgy vélem, hogy meg kell adni minden lehetőséget a Tiszának a kormányváltásra, ugyanakkor meg vagyok arról is győződve, hogy csakis egy, a Tiszánál jóval szélesebb népi mozgalom hozhat valódi rendszerváltást.

A jog fegyverré alakítása

Az Orbán-rendszer által alkotott jog hatálya alatt aligha érezheti bárki magát biztonságban: magánszemély, civil vagy szakmai szervezet, gazdasági társaság, politikus vagy egyszerű választópolgár, tehát bárki lehet a látszólagosan jogi formába öntött, valójában a politikai vezető színtiszta politikai akaratát megtestesítő gyűlöletpropaganda áldozata. A magyar jog elveszítette közjószág jellegét, nem a közkincsünk többé, hanem az Orbán-rendszer által privatizált politikai „tömegpusztító” fegyverként működik. Egy ilyen hatalmat pusztán az általa létrehozott választási rendszer kijátszásával nem lehet megdönteni, továbbá bizonyosak lehetünk abban is, hogy ha valaki arra vetemedik, hogy a jogot mások ellen fordítsa, akkor igen sok vesztenivalója lehet. A fegyverként alkalmazott jog általános kerete a rendkívüli jogrend volt, ahol a miniszterelnök az általa uralt kormányrendeletekkel gyakorlatilag bármit megtehetett, és a magyar parlamentarizmus maradékainak működését is felfüggesztve, törvényeket felülírva folytatta a rendeleti kormányzást.

Azt, hogy komoly gond van, hogy az Orbán-rendszer lényegében „alkotmányos diktatúrát” vezetett be, már a tizenöt, egyre radikálisabb irányt vevő Alaptörvény-módosításból sejthettük. Azt viszont, hogy meddig képes elmenni a rendszer a jog fegyverré alakítását tekintve, csak akkor tudtuk meg, amikor a miniszterelnök mind a Szőlő utcai tragédiát, mind pedig az önkormányzati szolidaritási hozzájárulás kapcsán kialakult jogvitát úgy akarta elrendezni, hogy a jogállamiságot garantáló alapvető törvényeket írt felül rendelettel, illetve visszaható hatállyal. Intézményi oldalról az orbánizmus állampárti megtestesülése és a jog fegyverként való működtetésének legfőbb útjelzője a Szuverenitásvédelmi Hivatal. Az már kortünet, hogy egy olyan rezsim hozott létre hivatalt a (nemlétező) szuverenitása védelmére, amely mind a trumpizmus, mind a putyinizmus számára kiszolgáltatta a saját országát és társadalmát – lemondva ezzel saját szuverenitásáról.

Az állandó háborús fenyegetés és a magyar putyinizmus mint hazaárulás

Az Orbán-rendszer már 2022 előtt is egy olyan fullasztó légkört hozott létre, amelynek fő funkciója a morális pánik és az állandó rettegés volt. Félni az ide valójában soha letelepedni nem vágyó bevándorlóktól, a civilektől, a „másoktól” (bármit is jelentsen ez), a hajléktalanoktól, a Nyugattól, az ellenzéktől. Az ukrajnai orosz agresszió nyomán azonban megváltozott valami, s a félelem tárgya immáron nem valamiféle „más” lett, hanem nagyon is ismerős: saját magunk, pontosabban a „belső ellenségnek” bélyegzettek. Az orbáni propaganda a magyar társadalmat saját maga ellen játssza ki, végletesen elidegeníti egymástól a különféle politikai nézeteket vallókat, és a háborús pszichózist arra használja fel, hogy a külső és belső ellenséget összemosva gyakorlatilag bárhol hazaárulót képes vizionálni. Ennek kerete a putyinizmus elméleti, ideológiai, geopolitikai és persze többek között az energetikában (olaj, földgáz, atomenergia) megtestesülő beszivárgása az Orbán-rendszerbe. Beszélhet a rezsim „keleti nyitásról”, „konnektivitásról”, multipoláris világrendről”, „világrendszerváltásról”, a lezajlott fordulat lényege mégiscsak az, hogy Orbán azért lett illiberális és szélsőjobboldali autoriter politikai vezető, mert a Putyin által kínált minták alapján sokkal könnyebb egy olyan rendszerben megtartani a hatalmat, ahol az állampárttá alakult hegemón centrum lényegében bármit megtehet.

A háborús pszichózis és a putyinizmus az ukrajnai katasztrófával összeért, és minden eddiginél jobban bebizonyosodott: az Orbán-rendszer a putyinista érdekek legfőbb megtestesítője és lobbistája az EU-ban és a NATO-ban. Ma pedig már ott tartunk, hogy az orosz rezsim nyíltan avatkozik be (mind elnöki szinten, mind pedig feltehetően operatív eszközökkel) az Orbán-rendszer fennmaradása érdekében. Úgy vélem tehát, hogy mindez önmagában is elegendő annak a drámai szempontnak a kijelentéséhez, hogy az Orbán-rendszer működtetői elárulták a saját hazájukat és az európai szövetségesi rendszert, s minderre rárakódik az, hogy rezsim a propaganda és a gyűlöletpolitika eszközével képes volt átalakítani a támogatóik meggyőződését, kialakította a putyinizmus hazai társadalmi hátországát. Nem lehet tehát véletlen, hogy az Orbán-rendszer választási kampánya nem a magyar emberek mindennapi problémáiról, hanem geopolitikai és putyinista összeesküvés-elméletekről szól.

A diktatúra legitimálása

Ami az utóbbi időszakban a szemünk előtt zajlik, az nem demokratikus kormányzás, nem egy demokratikus kampány, hanem a diktatúra legitimálása. Fogalmazzunk tehát világosan: rendeleti úton (értsd: teljhatalommal) kormányozza Magyarországot egy olyan miniszterelnök, aki putyinista érdekek mentén cselekszik (értsd: egyáltalán nem szuverén). Hazugság és önmagunk becsapása lenne tehát magunkat azzal áltatni, hogy 2026-ban egy demokratikus választás lesz. Egyrészt maga az Orbán-rendszer alakította ki azokat az igazságtalan választási és finanszírozási feltételeket, amelyek a rendszer fennmaradásának kedveznek. Másrészt, ugyan elképzelhető, hogy a mindenkori győztest preferáló választási rendszerben a Tisza Párt által becsatornázott társadalmi elégedetlenség utat tör magának (ezért írtam azt, hogy meg kell adni minden lehetőséget a kormányváltáshoz), de ez az erő is kevés lehet annak az orbáni hatalomnak a leváltásához, amely minden tekintetben autoriter irányokba mozdult el és nincs számára visszaút.

Orbán Viktor putyinista érdekeket testesít meg az által, hogy a választási kampányban nem elsősorban belföldi ellenfeleivel, és már nem is elsősorban az EU vezetésével, hanem az ukrán politikával szemben határozza meg magát. Ideje kimondani: az Orbán-rendszer nem demokratikus felhatalmazást keres a választásban, hanem immáron a kifejlett autoriter rezsim tömegtámogatását kívánja demonstrálni.

Harcolhatunk-e demokráciáért?

Ott, ahol a hatalom minden tekintetben autoriter irányba mozdul el, nemcsak lehetőség, de egyfajta állampolgári kötelesség is a demokráciáért harcolni. Howard Zinn amerikai történész 1972-ben azt írta: „Nem a polgári engedetlenség a mi problémánk. A mi problémánk a polgári engedelmesség.” Elképzelhető tehát az, hogy az Orbán-rendszer leváltásának első lépése a felette aratott választási győzelem.

Ebben az írásban arra kívántam felhívni a figyelmet, hogy a rezsim utóbbi időszakban tetten érhető radikalizálódása azt bizonyítja, hogy az orbánizmus mindent meg fog tenni a hatalomban maradásért és ha a választáson kívül nem gondolkodunk egyéb eszközökben, akkor a rendszer manipulációi következtében nagyon könnyen találhatjuk magunkat olyan helyzetben, hogy a szavazást a rendszer önmaga önkénye szerint fogja értelmezni: ez lesz a „diktatúra választása”.

Milyen eszközök állnak tehát rendelkezésükre ahhoz, hogy harcoljunk a demokráciáért? Először is érdemes tudatosítani magunkban azt, hogy az autoriter rendszerrel szembeni harc korántsem ér véget a választással, hiszen a rendszer lebontása egy hosszú folyamat. Másrészt pedig ehhez a harchoz lenne szükség a Tisza Párton túlmutató népi tömegmozgalomra, amely képes a tömegtüntetés és akár a tömegsztrájk eszközével elérni a rendszer bukását és azt, hogy kormányozható maradjon az ország. Ugyanis a mostani kampány alapján nem lehet afelől kétségünk, hogy az Orbán-rendszer mögött olyan belföldi és külföldi érdekek állnak, amelyek bármilyen eszközt hajlandó bevetni a hatalomért mind a választás előtt és során, mint pedig azt követően. Nem lehetünk tehát biztosak abban, hogy egy lehetséges ellenzéki választási győzelem elhozza a várva várt katarzis: egy beágyazott autokrácia lebontása hosszabb folyamatot és elkötelezett társadalmi ellenállást követelhet meg. Készen kell tehát állni bármilyen olyan békés engedetlenségre, amellyel megakadályozhatjuk a putyinizmus európai előretörését és az Orbán-rendszer putyinista fordulatának stabilizálódását.

A szerző jogász, politológus

Fejezzék be a nagyszülők az unokák háborúval való riogatását! (ATV, Egyenes beszéd 2026. március 19.)

Az Egyenes beszéd 2026. március 19-i műsorában kifejtettem, hogy nagyon úgy tűnik, hogy a magyar miniszterelnök mind belpolitikai, mind EU-s viszonylatban Putyin, orosz elnök magyar hangjaként működik. Orbán Putyin harcát vívja elsősorban propagandisztikus, másodsorban provokációs eszközökkel Zelenszkij ellen. Nagyon fájdalmasnak találom, hogy egy önmagát szuverenistának mondó politikus kampányát külföldi érdekek határozzák meg. Rámutattam, hogy amit Orbánék kampányként csinálnak az maga a „hamis zászlós” hadművelet.

Kifejezetem, hogy a Tisza Párt összemosása az ukránokkal gyalázatos. Ha egy percig is végiggondoljuk, hogy lehetne az ukrajnai háború tétje az, hogy a Tisza Párt hatalomra kerüljön? Utaltam arra is, hogy számomra nagyon úgy tűnik, hogy lélektani értelemben mindenképpen, de a politikai kommunikációs szempontból Putyin arra használja Orbánt, hogy egy új hadszínteret nyisson Ukrajna felé az EU-ból. Érdemes végre kimondani, hogy ez nem más mint hazaárulás. 

Az Irán elleni háborúba való magyar beavatkozás kapcsán rámutattam, hogy Orbán a világot háborúkkal felforgató autokraták lekötelezettje. Érdekes, hogy a békepárti magyar miniszterelnök a háborút „különleges katonai műveletnek” nevező Putyin és a Béketanácsot létrehozó, de egyúttal Amerikát háborúba taszító Trump szövetségese. Hogy állhat Orbán a béke pártján, ha minden szövetséges háborúzik?

Felvetettem továbbá azt is, az Orbán-rendszer lehet annyira rossz állapotban, hogy a magyar állam szerveit közvetlenül felhasználja az ellenzék ellen. Ha ezt megteszi az orbáni politika, akkor azzal végső soron el is dőlt, hogy Orbán a putyini utat választotta, ahonnan nincs visszatérés. Azt is elmondtam, hogy a háborús pszichózisra alapuló kampányt végre valahára be kellene fejezni, mert ez visszavonhatatlanul jelen van a magyar családokban: nagyszülők azzal riogatják unokáikat, hogy az ellenzék háborúba vinné az országot – mindez nem normális helyzet, be kell fejezni! A magyar társadalom jelentős része dühös, kiábrándult és ezt a rendszer okozta: ezen a helyzeten csakis közösen változtathatunk!

Authoritarian Law in Hungary (Istanbul Policy Center, online, February 24 2026)

I will be giving an online lecture on February 24, 2026, at the Istanbul Policy Center's event entitled Authoritarianism Through Law: Global Patterns of Legalism as Governance. The title of my lecture is: Authoritarian Law in Hungary.

Az ilyen rendelet ellen lázadni kell (ATV, Egyenes beszéd, 2026. február 4.)

2026. február 4-én az ATV Egyenes beszéd című műsorának vendége voltam és a fő téma a kormány 15/2026. (II. 3.) rendelete volt, amellyel az Orbán-rendszer az ukrajnai orosz aggresszióra való hivatkozással rendelettel és visszamenőleges hatállyal zárja ki a jogorvoslati lehetőséget a szolidaritási hozzájárulás kapcsán indult perekben, illetve folyamatban lévő pereket szünetet meg. Kifejtettem, hogy nevezhetnénk ezt egy újabb Rubiconnak a jogállam leépítését illetően, csak az a helyzet, hogy Magyarországon több mint egy évtizede folyamatosan rendkívüli jogrend van és nincs jogállam. Amit látunk a Magyar Közlöny hasábjain az mintha jogszabály lenne, de ez a magyar miniszterelnök nyílt politikai akarata. Ebben az értelemben nem-jog és mint ilyen semmis. Történeti kontextusként utaltam arra is, hogy a második világháború során az ilyen aktusokat Gustav Radbruch jogellenes jogtalanságnak nevezte, amelyet nem szabad jogként elfogadni, pontosan az általa közvetített mérhetetlen igazságtalanság miatt. Kifejtettem azt is, hogy mit várhatunk attól a hatalomtól, amely az állampolgárai ellen fordulva a kampányban személyes adatokat használ fel és tesz nyilvánosan elérhetővé. Az ilyen megnyilvánulások és a jogi köntösbe csomagolt nyílt politikai akarat ellen jogunk van lázadni. Órisái probléma, hogy az Orbán-rendszer nem tiszteli sem a magánszemélyek, sem pedig az intézmények autonómiáját. Nem lehet már tudni, hogy hol kezdődik a magyar állam és hol végződik a kormányzópárt: mindez klasszikus pártállami helyzet.